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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes the periphery proves to be of central importance. In
its infant years, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)' has• 2
undergone much critical scrutiny. This Article moves us to the pe-
t Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I am grateful to Herschel
Elkins, Special Assistant Attorney General for Consumer Policy, Coordination, and De-
velopment in the California Attorney General's office; James Tierney, Director of the
State Attorney General Program at Columbia Law School and former Attorney General
of Maine; and three anonymous representatives from three different state offices of
attorney general (referenced in footnotes as State A, State B, and State C) for sharing
with me their knowledge of and experience with the CAFA settlement notice provision.
Howard Erichson, Trevor Morrison, and William Rubenstein provided helpful com-
ments, and Jacob Karabell provided excellent research assistance and participation in
fieldwork.
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2 See, e.g., Symposium, Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439 (2008); Symposium, Emerging Issues in Class Action Law,
53 UCLA L. REv. 1303 (2006).
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riphery to evaluate the largely ignored settlement notice provision.3
The provision mandates that notice of every class action settlement
within CAFA's purview must be provided to "appropriate" federal and
state officials.4 The relevant federal official is the Attorney General of
the United States.5 As for the states, the relevant official is the one
who has "primary regulatory or supervisory responsibility with respect
to the defendant, or who licenses or otherwise authorizes the defen-
dant to conduct business in the State," or, by default, the attorney
general (AG) of any state in which any class member lives.6
Defense counsel shoulders the burden of providing the requisite
notice.' Appropriate notice must be provided to a state official in
every state in which class members reside.8 The relevant officials must
receive copies of the complaint, class notice, proposed settlement, and
other pertinent materials.: The officials need not respond (or even
acknowledge receipt), but a judge's order giving final approval of a
proposed settlement may not be issued until ninety days after appro-
priate notification to state and federal officials-thus giving the offi-
3 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (Supp. V 2005).
4 Id.
Id. § 1715(a)(1) (A).
6 Id. § 1715(a)(2). Only if there is no primary regulator of the activity does the
state AG qualify:
Thus, for example, in a case against an insurance company involving insur-
ance practices, such as how premiums are calculated, notice would be re-
quired to the state insurance commissioner in each state where the company
is licensed and where class members reside. If some class members reside in
states where the company does not do business and therefore is not subject to
regulation, then notice would be given to those states' attorneys general.
Similarly, if the company at issue were a toy manufacturer, which is not li-
censed by a particular regulatory body, then notice would have to be given to
the state attorney general of each state where plaintiffs reside.
S. REP. No. 109-14, at 34 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 33.
However, as Robert Klonoff and Mark Herrmann have noted, § 1715(e) binds
class members to the settlement only when the required notice under § 1715(b) is di-
rected either to the state AG or to the person that has primary regulatory authority. See
Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived Ap-
proach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695, 1709 (2006). It remains unclear
whether a defendant must serve both the primary regulator and the AG, or whether
one of the two suffices. See id. at 1708 ("Given the severity of the punishment, defen-
dants should err on the side of over-notifying state officials.").
7 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b).
8 Id.
Id.
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cials time to act if they so wish.'0 The consequences of noncompli-
ance are quite drastic: should a defendant fail to comply with the no-
tice provision, a class member can choose not to be bound by the set-
tlement agreement."
Little is known about why this provision was added to CAFA, and
the legislative history is scant. Nonetheless, it has been an enduring
feature since the legislation was first proposed in 1997.12 At the most
basic level, the provision ensures that "a responsible state and/or fed-
eral official receives information about proposed class action settle-
ments and is in a position to react if the settlement appears unfair to
some or all class members or inconsistent with applicable regulatory
policies."' 3 Specialized state regulatory authorities (or the state AG in
the absence of a state regulator) are likely to be familiar with the busi-
ness practices at issue in the litigation, and they are well situated to
"voice concerns if they believe that the class action settlement is not in
the best interest of their citizens."'14 The overriding purpose seems to
have been to prevent lawyers from crafting abusive settlements favor-
ing themselves over consumers or other injured parties.' In this vein,
10 Id. § 1715(d). The ninety-day period was chosen as "consistent with the period
normally needed to provide notice to class members and allow parties to opt-out, in-
tervene, or otherwise respond." John Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, Litigating in
the New Class Action World: A Guide to CAFA 's Legislative History, 6 CLASS ACTION LITIG.
REP. 403, 414 (2005).
11 28 U.S.C. § 1715(e)(1). Given the draconian penalty, mere "technical" viola-
tions may be forgiven:
The Committee wishes to make clear that [§ 1715(e)(1)] is intended to ad-
dress situations in which defendants have simply defaulted on their notifica-
tion obligations under this provision; it is not intended to allow settlement
class members to walk away from an approved settlement based on a technical
noncompliance (e.g., notification of the wrong person, failure of the official
to receive notice that was sent), particularly where good faith efforts to comply
occurred.
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 35, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 34.
12 S. 254, 105th Cong. sec. 2, § 1711 (g)(1) (1997).
13 S. REP. No. 109-14, at 32, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 32.
14 Id. at 5, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6.
15 The legislative history does not disclose which parties or interest groups favored
such a provision. On one view, it was urged by the defense bar as a shield against fur-
ther challenges to proposed settlements. Telephone Interview with Representative
from State A's AG's office (Feb. 8, 2008). The provision, however, gives little to defen-
dants as a legal matter, as it neither grants immunity nor alters rules of preclusion.
Members of the defense bar, moreover, have complained about the potentially oner-
ous burden it places on them, in addition to the drastic consequences it creates should
they fail to provide the requisite notice. See Anthony Rollo & Gabriel A. Crowson,
Mapping the New Class Action Frontier-A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act and
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the provision provides "a check against inequitable settlements in
these cases," which could arise from "collusion between class counsel
and defendants to craft settlements that do not benefit the injured
parties." 6
Some legal scholars have begun to ask whether CAFA's settlement
notice provision will awaken a "sleeping giant." 17 The scant existing
commentary is of two minds.' This perhaps reflects the juxtaposition
of the lofty goal of aggressive AG monitoring against the fact that the
AGs lack a precise mandate for official review, let alone any additional
resources for the endeavor. Thus, while the relevant state officials
must be given notice, there is no requirement that they take any ac-
Amended Federal Rule 23, CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP., Spring-Summer 2005, at 11, 17
("Perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of CAFA's 'Consumers' Class Action Bill of
Rights' from the defense perspective is its new onerous notification duty in class action
settlements.").
On another view, the provision reflects Congress's view that having AG input on
prospective class action settlements is valuable and in the public interest. Then again,
the provision was resisted by nearly one-third of the state AGs. See infra notes 20-22 and
accompanying text.
16 S. REP. No. 109-14, at 35, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34; see also
151 CONG. REC. S450 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kohl) ("The Attorney
General review is an extra layer of security for the plaintiffs and is designed to ensure
that abusive settlements are not approved without a critical review by one or more ex-
perts."); 147 CONG. REC. 22740 (2001) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("To address the
problem where class members get nothing and attorneys get millions, the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2001 provides that notification of any proposed settlements must be
given to the State attorneys general or the primary regulatory or licensing agency of
any State whose citizens are involved."); 143 CONG. REc. 1292 (1997) (statement of
Sen. Kohl) (exhorting officials to "intervene in cases where they think the settlements
are unfair").
17 William B. Rubenstein, The Public Role in Private Governance: Some Reflec-
tions on CAFA's Early Experience 3-4 (Nov. 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) ("CAFA's AG-notice provision may occasion the awakening of a sleep-
ing giant-state enforcement authorities-much as the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ... spurred many large investors to engage in the governance of
securities class actions in new and surprising ways."). This Article began as a critical
response to Rubenstein's draft, which highlighted "the public role in private govern-
ance" as embodied in the CAFA settlement notice provision. As I will explore below,
Rubenstein's public versus private dichotomy is a significant-albeit partial-lens
through which to evaluate CAFA as regulatory policy.
Is Compare Klonoff & Herrmann, supra note 6, at 1707 ("As a regulatory mecha-
nism ... the notice provisions are unlikely to yield much benefit."), with Laurens
Walker, The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 849, 854 (2007) ("[Alctive participation by State Attorneys General in
response to Bill of Rights notices is likely.").
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tion whatsoever.' 9 Nor are any resources dedicated to the review of
class action settlements.
Equally deflating are the views expressed by the state AGs, several
of whom do not appear satisfied with their new CAFA-inspired role. A
group of fifteen state AGs wrote Congress to contend that the man-
dated notices "would be unlikely to reveal evidence of collusion, and
thus would provide little or no basis for objecting to the settlement."
20
The AGs further asserted that "[w] ithout clear authority in the legisla-
tion to more closely examine defendants on issues bearing on the
fairness of the proposed settlement (particularly out-of-state defen-
dants over whom subpoena authority may in some circumstances be
limited), the notification provision lacks meaning., 21 Finally, they also
feared that "[c] lass members could be misled into believing that their
interests are being protected by their government representatives,
simply because the notice was sent to the Attorney General of the
United States, State Attorneys General and other federal and state
regulators."22
Whether or not the CAFA settlement notice provision will radi-
cally-or even perceptibly-alter the class action landscape, it none-
theless provides a useful lens through which to examine the much
broader topic of CAFA as regulatory policy. By inviting intervention
by a state governmental actor in ex post private litigation under the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, this one small provision presents a
microcosm of the trenchant federalism, regulatory, and institutional
debates spawned by CAFA.
I. MYRLAD DIMENSIONS OF CAFA AS REGULATORY POLICY
The subject of CAFA as regulatory policy is immense. As if
through a refracting lens, CAFA's image is transformed by the angle
from which it is viewed. A series of progressively unfolding dyads pro-
vides a useful heuristic for isolating particular aspects of CAFA's regu-
latory nature.
19 See 151 CONG. REc. S451 (daily ed.Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kohl) ("We
do not require that State attorneys general do anything with the notice they receive.").
20 Letter from Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. Attorney Gen., et al., to Senators Bill Frist &
Harry Reid (Feb. 7, 2005), reprinted in 151 CONG. REc. H644-45 (daily ed. Feb. 16,
2005).
21 Id.
22 Id.
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In a previous article, Samuel Issacharoff and I proposed a frame-
work to situate CAFA within the broader trend of federalization of
substantive law and procedural fora, which we argued was a notable
feature of the two-decades-long Rehnquist Court. We set forth a
stylized two-by-two matrix, designed to highlight our focus on the
federalization trend across two separate dimensions: substantive law
(federal or state) and procedural forum (federal or state) . Amidst
what we perceived as an overall momentum in case law and legisla-
tive developments away from state law and state fora toward federal
standards and federal fora (depicted by the arrow in Table 1), we lo-
cated CAFA in a potentially unstable, partially federalized quadrant,
characterized by a regulatory mismatch between the source of law
governing primary conduct and the forum. CAFA centralizes in fed-
eral court cases affecting the national market, but it fails to provide a
source of federal law to govern these actions.2 By probing "an un-
derexplored link between the emergence of predominant federal
substantive law overcoming the problems of horizontal coordination
among the states, and the correspondingly expanding role of the
,, 2Cfederal forum in creating a nurturing incubator for that law, our
matrix sheds light on the regulatory mismatch that CAFA represents.
23 See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA
L. REX'. 1353, 1415-20 (2006).
24 See id. at 1359; infta Table 1.
23 CAFA expands the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions
bearing on national market conduct. See CAFA § 2(b) (2), (a) (4), 28 U.S.C. § 1711
note (Supp. V 2005) (stating that in enacting CAFA, Congress sought to "restore
the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Fed-
eral court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity
jurisdiction" and to stem "[a]buses" that were "keeping cases of national impor-
tance out of Federal court"). Some have argued, however, that the overinclusive-
ness of the bill's jurisdictional provisions allows cases where one state's interests
dominate to be situated in federal court nonetheless. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bur-
bank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View,
156 U. PA. L. REX'. 1439, 1542 (2008) ("CAFA's exceptions should be amended
now to restore the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants in class ac-
tions where a state's interest in regulation through litigation is intense and where
the argument for federal jurisdiction relies on the fictions of corporate citizenship
and the gathering powers of federal courts.").
26 Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 23, at 1418.
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Procedural
Forum
Table 1: Federal/State Dimensions
Substantive Law
Federal Law State Law
Federal CAFA
Forum
State
Forum
As with all stylized heuristics, however, separate dimensions of the
link between CAFA and regulatory policy remain out of focus. One
perhaps glaring omission was inattention to the institutional dimen-
sion of regulatory policy-namely whether the attempt to control
primary conduct of actors is achieved by ex ante regulation by agen-
cies or ex post common-law liability by private actors. This institu-
tional dimension is front and center in a recent article of mine, which
sets forth another two-by-two matrix to organize an analysis of federal
preemption of state tort law claims. For example, in the context of
the regulation of pharmaceutical drug labeling, the central issue in
preemption controversies is whether the fairly stringent ex ante scru-
tiny of prescription drug labels' content prior to the approval of a new
drug application should foreclose ex post litigation of failure-to-warn
claims brought by private litigants in state or federal court.
In the particular context of federal preemption of state products
liability claims, the ex ante/ex post regulatory mechanism maps by
and large onto discrete institutional actors operating at the federal
versus state level-regulation by federal agencies in the ex ante con-
text and private litigation of state tort claims in the ex post context.
Federal agencies-such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
National Highway Transit and Safety Administration (NHTSA), and
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)-generally conduct ex
27 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449, 480 (2008); infra Table 2.
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ante product regulation pursuant to federal statutes and regulations.
In contrast, most ex post private litigation involves state statutory or
common law standards (with the exception of state negligence per se
actions based on the violation of a federal statutory standard). This
need not be the case, however. In certain areas-for example, insur-
ance and gaming-states have specialized executive departments or
28commissions. Once again, we can turn the refracting lens, this time
to sharpen the distinction between regulatory mechanism and institu-
tional actor.
Table 2: Ex Ante/Ex Post Regulation
Federal Law State Law
Ex Ante State Regulations:Regulation Federal Regulations:..
eguation FDA, NHTSA, CPSC Insurance Commissioner,
(Agencies) Gaming Commissioner "o
Ex Post
Common Law
Liability Negligence per se Actions Private.Tort 
Litigation
(Courts)
28s Other representative examples include the Texas Department of Licensing and
Regulation, which oversees more than twenty types of businesses and agencies, includ-
ing electricians and talent agencies, see http://www.license.state.tx.us/ (last visited Apr.
15, 2008); the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, which regulates public utilities, oil
and gas, and transportation, see http://www.occ.state.ok.us/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2008); and the Hawaii Office of Consumer Protection, which undertakes various
consumer protection functions, see http://hawaii.gov/dcca/quicklinks/consumer
resource-center (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
29 See, e.g., Arizona Department of Insurance, http://www.id.state.az.us/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2008); Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, http://wvw.floir.com/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2008); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role of Insurance Regulation, 68
N.Y.U. L. REv. 13, 14 (1993) ("Among major financial institutions in the United States,
only insurance firms are subject to plenary state regulation.").
30 See, e.g., California Gambling Control Commission; http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2008); Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, http://
www.pgcb.state.pa.us/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
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It is instructive to superimpose another dimension, the pub-
lic/private dichotomy, on the ex ante versus ex post dimension of the
previous matrix. Considered along this new matrix, government
(here, represented by the state AGs; in my prior analysis, by federal
agencies-thus implicating the federalism dimension from Table 1 as
well) occupies the space of public ex ante regulator, as well as ex post
regulator.
Table 3: Public/Private Regulation
3
1
Public Private
Ex Ante Regulation Market
(i) Punishment (Criminal (i) Private Litigation3 2
and Civil Proceedings) (ii) Private Participation in
Ex Post (ii) Government Litigation Government Proceedings
for Money Damages
(iii) Government Participa- (as Grievant, Witness,
tion in Private Litigation Intervenor, or Counsel)
In the latter guise, government assumes myriad roles: it (1) initiates
parallel litigation; 33 (2) participates in private litigation, as intervenor,
31 Howard Erichson deserves credit for helping me sharpen the focus of Table 3.
32 It bears emphasizing that, while private litigation occupies the sphere of ex post
regulation, it nonetheless imposes ex ante incentives on actors in the system. See infra
notes 102, 107, and accompanying text.
33 Attorneys general are charged with investigating claims and bringing actions in
the public interest. Such cases typically are brought pursuant to the AGs' parens patriae
authority under consumer protection or antitrust statutes. See, e.g., Richard P. leyoub &
Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney GeneralActions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of
Parens Patiae, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1859, 1860-61 (2000) (suggesting that states' parens pa-
triae actions against tobacco companies aided plaintiffs in private cases).
Parens patriae suits were the subject of much congressional debate over CAFA.
CAFA permits defendants to remove "mass actions" (or class-action-like lawsuits) from
state to federal court, but it contains an exception for parens patriae actions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(1l)(B)(ii)(lll) (Supp. V 2005); 151 CONG. REC. S1164 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Th[e] statutory definition makes it perfectly clear
that the bill applies only to class actions, and not parens patriae actions."). But the ab-
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objector, or amicus; 34 and, (3) per CAFA's settlement notice provision,
reviews the outcome of private litigation (i.e., settlements).3 ' Hence, we
see that the AG occupies a hybrid public-private governance role.36 The
settlement notice provision creates a mechanism for public oversight of
private litigation and thus an opportunity for cooperative regulation• 37
spurred by public and private parties. The AG's role in this new regu-
sence of a parallel exception for traditional class actions brought by AGs irked several
congressmen opposing the bill; it also spurred the National Association of Attorneys
General (NAAG) to write a worried letter to Congress. See Letter from NAAG to Sena-
tors Bill Frist and Harry Reid (Feb. 7, 2005), reprinted in 151 CONG. REC. H740 (daily
ed. Feb. 17, 2005); see also 151 CONG. REC. S1158, 1159 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (state-
ment of Sen. Pryor) ("It is my concern, as well as those of 46 attorneys general, that
certain provisions in S. 5 might be interpreted to hamper their ability to bring such
actions, thereby impeding one means of protecting their citizens from unlawful activity
and resulting harm.").
34 See, e.g., Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Con-
temporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 631 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting intervention by the
New York AG's office in support of the defendant's claim that the dances, songs, and
costumes in dispute belonged to the defendant and not the plaintiff estate); Iberia
Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 162 (5th Cir. 2004) (not-
ing intervention by the Louisiana AG as plaintiff in a class action brought by consum-
ers against wireless service providers, alleging deceptive trade practices and breach of
contract); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1251 (N.Y. 2006) (explaining
the intervention of New York's AG on behalf of an undocumented alien plaintiff seek-
ing to recover lost earnings under the state's labor law). See generally Arthur F.
Greenbaum, Government Participation in Private Litigation, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 853 (1989)
(discussing myriad ways in which government can participate in private litigation, in-
cluding Rule 19 compulsory joinder, intervention via Rule 24 or specific statutes, con-
solidation of a government action with a private action, and participation as an amicus
curiae). Of particular relevance to this Article, Greenbaum tentatively recommended
a precursor to CAFA's notice provision, namely a statute that required notifying the
federal government of a private lawsuit "whenever a case raises issues of general impor-
tance involving federal interests or has the potential to impair or impede the Govern-
ment's interests as a practical matter." Id. at 872.
35 It is beyond peradventure that "[t]he powers and duties of the state attorney
general have 'dramatically expanded' over time." Trevor W. Morrison, The State Attor-
ney General and Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION (William Buzbee ed.) (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript
at 4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 088136.
See Rubenstein, supra note 17 (manuscript at 31-32) (discussing the "four sets of
ways in which public enforcement may intertwine with private class action lawsuits");
see alsoJody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 672
(2000) ("We cannot think creatively about the role of the state without first breaking
free of the hierarchical image of government power to which most of administrative
law theory now adheres."). As illustrated in Table 3, the role of private actors in gov-
ernment proceedings (as grievant, witness, intervenor, or counsel) offers a counter-
point to the sort of government involvement in private litigation envisioned by the
CAFA settlement notice provision.
37 In this respect, a comparison might be drawn to another public-private action:
qui tam actions, such as those pursued under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-
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latory mechanism should be placed in the wider context of ex post AG
involvement in civil litigation. Before assessing the likely effect of
CAFA, however, it is instructive to consider the pre-CAFA landscape.
II. PRE-CAFA LANDSCAPE: LUITTLE-STUDIED PAST
The first thing to keep in mind is that the CAFA settlement no-
tice provision does not confer new powers upon the state AGs. In-
deed, although the issue was apparently the subject of little scholarly
attention, states had not been altogether quiescent on the private-
settlement review front.' Certain AG's offices-namely those in Cali-
fornia, Florida, New York, and Texas-had been particularly proac-
tive in activities I will roughly categorize as (1) filing individual objec-
tions to a class action settlement; (2) coordinating a broader
resistance effort among a group of state AG's offices; and (3) protect-
ing and/or initiating independent litigation in the wake of the class
action settlement.39
3733 (2000), and analogous state statutes. Qui tam relators can sue on behalf of the
government only after providing notice to the government. The relator's suit is also
subject to being taken over by the government and then to being settled or even dis-
missed over the relator's objection. The qui tam regulatory scheme-comprising
front-end governmental notice regime, accompanied by formal governmental takeover
power-can be distinguished from the CAFA settlement notice regime, which calls for
notice at the back end of the process and does not formally grant state AGs any take-
over power.
38 For a review of pre-CAFA state-AG involvement in the class action settlement
process, see Frank A. Hirsch,Jr., Pre-CAFA AG Interventions Provide Guidance on the
Impact of the Act's Regulatory Notification Requirement (Jan. 17, 2007), http://
www.nelsonmullins.com/news/neson-mullins-articles-speeches-detail.cfm?id=98, de-
scribing Milkman v. American Travelers Life Insurance Co., No. 3775 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1.);
Cummins v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 03-134 (W. Va. Cir. Ct.); and Roller-Edelstein v. Wynd-
ham International, Inc., No. 02-04946 (Tex. Dist. Ct.), cases also discussed below. I am
grateful to Frank Hirsch and Joseph Dowdy, attorneys at Nelson Mullins Riley & Scar-
borough, LLP, for providing me with primaly materials for the latter two cases.
Nor have state AGs been passive on the more general battleground of private liti-
gation. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflecting on Microsoft, To-
bacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lanryering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 34 (2000) ("The fundamental danger in allowing government lawyers to use
private claims as a bargaining chip is that negotiating parties will often prefer to re-
solve their dispute by shifting costs to absent third parties if possible."); Jason Lynch,
Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General in Multistate
Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2003-07 (2001) (describing reasons underlying
the rise in coordinated litigation by state AGs that began in the early 1980s).
39 It bears mention that these roughly hewn categories bleed into one another and
are by no means mutually exclusive. See infra text accompanying note 89.
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A. A G Objections
Some state AG's offices have a history of objecting to class action
settlements. This is not to say, however, that their involvement consis-
tently has a perceived impact. Here, I provide some illustrative exam-
ples from the generally proactive AG's offices of New York, California,
and Florida.
The New York AG objected to the settlement of a Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act claim brought by stockbrokers against their employer.4 0 The
AG made three forceful objections: the New York claimants would re-
ceive less than California claimants had secured in a parallel settle-
ment, the plaintiffs' counsel deserved a smaller fee award, and any dif-
ference between the requested attorneys' fees and the court's awarded
fees should not revert to the defendant.4' None of these arguments
dissuaded the court from approving the settlement.4' Another federal
district court likewise rebuffed the California AG when he tried to up-
end a $4.5 million settlement of a class action filed by consumers
against a product manufacturer that allegedly made false representa-
tions in its advertising. The AG insisted that the defendant's insurance
policies might provide for a recovery of $2 million for each of the more
than fifty thousand putative class members, but the court rejected
these arguments on the ground that the AG was essentially asking for a
full trial on the merits of each claim prior to settlement.
Sometimes an AG's office simply wants to express disapproval
without necessarily aiming to derail the settlement. Such was the case
when the Florida AG filed an amicus brief in a class action brought by
patients against Aetna to express concern about the settlement's defi-
nition of "medical necessity." 44 An AG objection can also lead the par-
ties to modify the settlement, as was the result in Access Now, Inc. v.
40 See Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 06-4068, 2007 WL 221862, at *1-2 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) (noting the appearance of the New York AG as amicus curiae).
41 See Proposed Amicus Curiae Memorandum of Law of New York Attorney Gen-
eral at 1-2, Glass, No. 06-1068 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2006), 2006 WL 3851912.
42 See Glass, 2007 W4L 221862, at *17.
43 See In re Rio Hair Naturalizer Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1055, 1996 WL
780512, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 1996) ("Overlooked by the Attorney General is the
obvious fact that a full trial, with the attendant costs of pre-trial discovery, would fur-
ther deplete the assets available for settlement and could just as likely result in a find-
ing of no coverage whatsoever leaving absolutely nothing for the injured claimants.");
id. at *2 n.3 ("The Court has been advised that as of the date of this Order, 52,436
claims have been submitted.").
44 See In re Managed Care Litig., No. 00-1334, 2003 WL 22850070, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 24, 2003). Despite the AG's objections, the court approved the settlement Id. at *7.
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Cunard Line Co. 4 ' In that case, the Florida AGjoined the United States
AG to object to the settlement of a class action alleging that two of the
defendant's cruise ships did not comply with Americans with Disabili-
ties Act regulations.46 The Florida AG was particularly concerned that
the settlement released the defendants from any claims under appli-
cable state law and would thereby undermine the Florida AG's efforts
to enforce state accessibility laws. 47 The settlement was subsequently
modified, and although the final terms were not disclosed, both AGs
481
withdrew their respective objections.
B. Coordinated AG Efforts to Object
State AG's offices do not always act alone. Coordinated efforts on
behalf of several state AG's offices likewise seem to have been
prompted by the more active offices. Here, too, I provide some repre-
sentative examples.
In September 2001, the Texas AG opposed the proposed settle-
ment of a class action alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices in
the insurance industry in Pennsylvania state court.43  In its amicus
brief, the AG explained that the filed class action overlapped with an
investigation by Texas public authorities into insurance industry prac-
tices . 5" The AG asserted, moreover, that it was in a better position to
represent the interests of Texas class members. 51 Thirty-four state and
commonwealth AGs filed a letter in support of the Texas AG. 2 The
trial court nonetheless rebuffed the Texas AG's attempt to remove the
Texas plaintiffs from the binding settlement.53
45 No. 00-7233, 2001 WL 1622015 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2001).
46 See Complaint at 2-7, Access Now, No. 00-7233 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2000), 2000 WL
34461959.
47 See Objections of Attorney General Amicus Curiae of the State of Florida to
Proposed Class Action Settlement Agreement at 2, Access Now, No. 00-7233 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 11, 2001), 2001 WL 34700858.
48 See Access Now, 2001 WL 1622015, at *1.
49 Milkman v. Am. Travellers Life Ins. Co. (Milkman I), No. 3775, 2001 WL
1807376, at *4 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 26, 2001).
50 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Attorney General at 3-7, Milkman I, No. 3775 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Sept. 5, 2001), 2001 WL 34136843.
51 Id. at 2.
52 See Milkman v. Ain. Travellers Life Ins. Co. (Milkman I1), No. 3775, 2002 WL
778272, at *1 n.2 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 1, 2002).
53 Milkman , 2001 WiL 1807376, at *10 (refusing to impose an "opt-in" requirement on
Texas plaintiffs because "[t] here is no evidence that [special] circumstances exist here").
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Another coordinated effort met a similar fate. Several state AGs
(from Connecticut, Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, New York, Nevada, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont) banded together to
object to a provision of the class action settlement agreement against
the owners of Chrysler minivans seeking a replacement for a defective
latch. 54 The offending provision gave Chrysler the option to suspend
relief to class plaintiffs in any jurisdiction where a state attempted to
bring an enforcement action asserting claims within the scope of the
settlement agreement. 5  The state AGs feared a "chilling effect" on
state enforcement, but the court paid little heed to the AGs' concerns.56
Not all such efforts have been in vain. Other coordinated efforts
have led to changes in the approved settlement. In approving the no-
torious class action settlement in In re Prudential Insurance Co. of Amer-
ica Sales Practices Litigation,57 Judge Anthony Scirica drew attention to
the fact that several "enhancements" were made to the proposed set-
tlement on account of several states' (California, Florida, Texas, and
Massachusetts) objections to the initial settlement. 5
54 See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1018, 1028 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1998).
Incidentally, this class action lawsuit followed closely on the heels of a NHTSA investi-
gation, providing support for the "piggyback" theory, where private litigation follows in
the wake of regulatory action. See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
5 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1028.
56 Id. For yet another example of a futile coordinated AG effort, see In re Real Es-
tate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 633, 1986 WL 6531 (E.D. Pa. June
10, 1986). There, the AGs from Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wis-
consin filed a joint memorandum opposing the settlement of an antitrust class action
alleging that the defendant fixed the price of title search, title examination, and set-
tlement services. Id. at *6. Notwithstanding the states' objections, the court approved
the settlement, noting the "almost insurmountable difficulties that the plaintiffs would
have faced in obtaining any relief had they continued with this litigation." Id. at *22.
57 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998).
58 Id. at 298. Judge Scirica also drew support for the settlement from the partici-
pation of the thirty states that comprised the "Multi-State Task Force":
[W]e are cognizant that the original framework of this settlement resulted
from the efforts of the Multi-State Task Force. The involvement of the various
state insurance regulators, with their vast experience and expertise, provides
great support in favor of the fairness of the settlement. In addition, we are
impressed by the seal of approval this settlement has received from the insur-
ance regulators of each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Id. at 329.
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C. AG Pursuit of Litigation in the Wake of Objection
The success of AG objection and intervention cannot be measured
fully by settlements either derailed or modified prior to judicial ap-
proval. This is because another mode of AG participation is to object
in order to stave off adverse effects on its own pending investigation
or lawsuit. Relatedly, AGs have initiated litigation in the wake of a
proposed class action settlement.
Several examples illustrate the AGs' efforts to block proposed set-
tlements in order to protect their own litigation turf. 59 Take, for in-
stance, objections raised by several state AGs to a proposed settlement
of a class action suit brought in federal district court in East St. Louis,
Illinois, against the national sweepstakes firm, Publishers Clearing
House, for having allegedly engaged in notorious fraudulent prac-
tices. o Fearing that "an imminent settlement of a private class-action
suit might preclude other suits," sixteen AGs filed their own lawsuits. '3,
While their objections to the East St. Louis, Illinois, settlement fell on
deaf ears, the AGs were nonetheless successful in pursuing their own
59 Objecting before final approval of a settlement seems well advised. Alterna-
tively, an AG also could institute a parens patriae action collaterally challenging a set-
tlement approved in another forum, though any challenge would be subject to appli-
cable preclusion principles. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1649, 1719 (2008) (contending that, post-
CAFA, collateral challenges to the terms of a federal-court-approved settlement should
only succeed if plaintiffs did not have "[a] full and fair opportunity to raise perform-
ance defects" in the rendering forum).
"" See, e.g., Press Release, Connecticut Attorney General's Office, Court Urged to Re-
ject Publishers Clearing House's Proposed Settlement (Nov. 15, 1999) (quoting Attorney
General Richard Blumenthal's assertion that "[t]his settlement proposal is artfully crafted
to discourage thousands of consumers victimized by PCH from pursuing the refunds they
deserve...."), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/iew.asp?A=1774&Q=282822;
Telephone Interview with Representative from State B's AG's office (Feb. 15, 2008)
("The settlement attempted to bar our claims as law enforcement, so we went into East
St. Louis and registered our objection.... Ultimately, the court dismissed our objec-
tions .... and we proceeded in our litigation with Publishers Clearing House, and I don't
believe the release language barred any of our claims."). In this instance, the AGs were
attuned to the private settlement because "each of the 50 states had investigations, and a
majority of states had filed lawsuits against Publishers Clearing House." d.
61 See Sweepstakes Firm Faces Lawsuit from 16 States, Associated Press, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH,Jan. 25, 2000, at AIl ("[Sixteen] states filed the suits because the attorneys
general feared an imminent settlement of a private class-action suit might preclude
other suits. A hearing on that settlement will be held today in U.S. District Court in
East St. Louis, Ill.").
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62litigation. Publishers Clearing House ultimately settled with officials
from all fifty states in two additional separate settlements.
63
A second example follows this same pattern of AGs' successful
continued pursuit of their own litigation in the wake of an initial de-
feat in objecting to a proposed class action settlement. In June 2002,
the Florida AG's office filed a lawsuit against the Wyndham Hotel
chain for deceptive trade practices involving undisclosed automatic
64surcharges improperly added to guests' hotel bills. While this case
was pending in Florida state court, the Wyndham chain entered into a
proposed class action settlement, filed in a Texas state court.' 5 Again,
fearing preclusion of its own litigation, the Florida AG intervened in
the Texas litigation.6 On substance, Florida's AG objected to the fact
that the settlement was a coupon settlement and on the ground that
the parties had failed to disclose enough information for the court
67properly to determine if the agreement was fair. The AG's involve-
ment led to a voluntary dismissal of the claims that overlapped with
the Florida action.68 The Florida AG then announced a $2.3 million
settlement of the Florida state case in July 2006. 69
62 Settlement Approved in Sweepstakes Suit, Associated Press, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Feb. 21, 2000, at Al0.
63 SeeLI's 100, NEWSDAY (NewYork), Sept. 17, 2001, at C16.
CA See Motion by State of Florida, Office of the Attorney General, Department of
Legal Affairs' to Continue Hearing on Preliminary Approval of Settlement at 3-4,
Roller-Edelstein v. Wyndham Int'l, Inc., No. 02-04946 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004)
("The Attorney General is currently in litigation with Wyndham International, Inc. and
has been since June, 2002 .... The lawsuit ... is based upon facts substantially the
same as those alleged in the instant proceeding, i.e., Wyndham's charging undisclosed
resort fees and other add-on fees, and the deceptive representation of some of these
fees .... ").
65 See Application for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Settlement Class and Set-
tlement, Roller-Edelstein, No. 02-04946 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 2004).
66 See Emergency Motion by State of Florida, Office of the Attorney General, De-
partment of Legal Affairs' to Continue Hearing on Preliminary Approval of Settle-
ment, Roller-Edelstein, No. 02-04946 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dec. 17, 2004). The Emergency Mo-
tion warned: "This Court's acceptance of a settlement may impact or even preclude
the Attorney General from obtaining damages for consumers in the Florida suit." Id.
at 2.
67 See Amended Memorandum of Law of State of Florida, Office of the Attorney
General, Department of Legal Affairs' in Opposition to Preliminary Approval of Set-
tlement at 6-11, Roller-Edelstein, No. 02-04946 (Tex. Dist. Ct.Jan. 19, 2005).
68 See Plaintiffs' Notice of Nonsuit, Roller-Edelstein, No. 02-04946 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May
10, 2005).
69 See Settlement Agreement, State v. Wyndham Int'l, Inc., No. 02-1296 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
July 28, 2006), available at http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/KGRG-6S8QXF/
$file/WyndhamSettlement.pdf; see also Peter Geier, State AGs Eschew Class Action Fairness
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The final example stems from a controversy involving H&R
Block's sale of high-interest loans to nationwide customers awaiting
70tax refunds. In December 2005, H&R Block entered into a pro-
posed nationwide class action settlement in a 2003 West Virginia state
court case." In February 2006, on the heels of the announcement of
the proposed nationwide class settlement, as well as its own extensive
investigation into H&R Block's allegedly deceptive marketing of loans
to Californians (who were on the hook for hundreds of dollars in feesand " 72
and interest), the California AG brought a civil enforcement action
for restitution against H&R Block in California.7 3 Then, in May 2006,
Act Review, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 2006, at 5 ("The settlement provided cash restitution for
consumers and required the hotels change their business practice.").
70 See Frank Norton, States Criticize H&R Block, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Aug. 16, 2006, at 1D. According to the article,
H&R Block reported revenue of $182 million on refund loans in 2005, about
4 percent of total sales. It paid more than $100 million to settle related law-
suits. The company faces suits this year filed by California... and New
York .... The California suit was filed on behalf of 1.5 million residents who
took out refund loans.
Jd.
71 See Cummins v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 03-134 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 23, 2005) (or-
der preliminarily approving class action settlement); see also Press Release, H&R Block,
H&R Block and Attorneys Propose Refund Loan Settlement to Court (Dec. 21, 2005),
available at http://hrbmortgage.net/press/Article.jsp?articleid=1238 ("The proposed
settlement was filed today in Cummins v. H&R Block, an action that has been pending
in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia since 2003. It would also settle
[the Ohio, Alabama, and Maryland] cases. Overall, the proposed settlement class
would include more than 8 million consumers.").
H&R Block had made several previous unsuccessful attempts to forge a nationwide
settlement. See Memorandum of the California Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at
4, Cummins, No. 03-134 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. May 31, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum of
California AG] (noting such attempts by H&R Block in Reynolds v. Beneficial National
Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002); Carnegie v. Household International., Inc.,
371 F. Stipp. 2d 954 (N.D. Ill. 2005); and Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank, 260 F.
Supp. 2d 680 (N.D. Ill. 2003)); id. at 12 ("H&R Block has now come to West Virginia,
presumably seeking a friendlier reception for its proposed nationwide settlements than
it has received in other jurisdictions."). Herschel Elkins kindly provided me with a
copy of this memorandum.
72 Herschel Elkins confirmed that that the California AG's office was investigating
H&R Block on these charges prior to the Cummins settlement. E-mail from Herschel
Elkins, Special Assistant Att'y Gen. for Consumer Policy, Coordination, and Dev., Cal.
Att'y Gen.'s Office, to author (Feb. 20, 2008) (on file with author).
73 See Memorandum of California AG, supra note 71, at 1-2 ("The Attorney General
has currently pending in San Francisco Superior Court a civil law enforcement ac-
tion ... against H&R Block, Inc. and several related H&R Block entities, alleging among
other things that Block violated California law in marketing its refund anticipation
loans."); see also Califarnia Sues H&1? Block, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Feb. 15, 2006,
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the California AG's office objected to the proposed nationwide set-
tlement in West Virginia state court. The AG argued that "the terms
of the Proposed Settlement are unfair, inadequate and unreasonable
with respect to California residents, and... Californians have little to
gain and much to lose from being included in the present action. 74
The AG worried, moreover, that H&R Block "may well attempt ... to
use settlement of the present action, if it is approved, to defeat or con-
fute the Attorney General's claims for restitution in the California
case." 75 Despite the AG's objection, the West Virginia state court ap-
proved the class action settlement. 6 In the wake of this setback, how-
ever, the California AG did not simply let the matter lie; instead, he
took matters into his own hands and vigorously pursued his own suit
against H&R Block.77
With this background of pre-CAFA activity in mind, we can pro-
ceed to examine the post-CAFA landscape.
III. POST-CAFA LANDSCAPE: UNCERTAIN FUTURE
781
A recently decided case, Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., pro-
vides a striking example of concerted AG activity on the post-CAFA
landscape just over the horizon. It is difficult to extrapolate from a
sample of one, but the key question is whether Sharper Image repre-
sents an anomaly or a harbinger of much more AG activity to come.
A. Formal Actions
In the Sharper Image case, a national class of Ionic Breeze purchas-
ers brought suit against Sharper Image, which marketed and distrib-
uted the air purifier. The class alleged that the Ionic Breeze was inef-
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news4/2006/02/ca hrhblock.html ("California At-
torney General Bill Lockyer today sued H&R Block alleging the tax preparation giant
has violated 15 state and federal laws in marketing and providing high-cost refund an-
ticipation loans (RALs), mainly to low-income families.").
74 Memorandum of California AG, supra note 71, at 16.
75 Id. at 14.
76 Cummins, No. 03-134 (order preliminarily approving class action settlement);
H&R Block, Inc., 2007 Annual Report (Form 10K), at 25 (June 29, 2007) (describing
the company's obligations resulting from settlement).
77 See David Twiddy, Taxing TimesforH&R Block, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 27, 2006,
at D6.
78 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
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fective and exposed consumers to hazardous ozone levels. 79  Ulti-
mately, the parties presented a proposed settlement agreement to the
court; for class members, the deal included a coupon for nineteen dol-
lars and a significant discount on an Ionic Breeze accessory designed
to reduce ozone emission. s°
Fulfilling CAFA's notice requirement, the defendant submitted
the required documentation to state AGs throughout the country.
Shortly thereafter, the AGs in thirty-five states and the District of Co-
lumbia filed an amicus brief urging the court to reject the proposal. 8'
The AGs condemned the "coupon settlement," noting that the
agreement did not prevent Sharper Image from increasing the cost of
its products to compensate for the coupons and arguing that the fee
award to class counsel was unjustly high.8" The AGs urged the court to
discount the fact that only a few class members personally objected to
the settlement, in light of the fact that the AGs represented "hundreds
,83of thousands if not millions of eligible class members in this action.
The parties subsequently amended the settlement agreement multiple
times, but the AGs continued to object.84 Ultimately, the court re-
79 See Plaintiffs Class Action Complaint at 6-7, Sharper Image, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292
(No. 05-21251), 2005 WL 1457853 (alleging claims for breach of contract).
80 See Renewed Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement, Conditional
Certification of the Settlement Class, Conditional Appointment of Settlement Class
Counsel and Settlement Class Representatives, Providing for Notice, Enjoining the
Prosecution of Released Claims, and Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 5-7, Sharper
Image, 517 F. StIpp. 2d 1292 (No. 05-21251), 2007 WL 617117.
81 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Attorneys General of Alaska et al. in Opposition
to the Proposed Settlement Agreement, Sharper Image, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (No. 05-
21251).
82 Id. at 6-11. One state AG representative put it more forcefully:
When we saw the CAFA notice, it was not ideal. It had the coupon aspects; the
attorneys' fees were substantial. I don't know if the fees alone would have led
us to object, but people would have paid hundreds of dollars for this unit and
if [the complaint was accurate that] the units were worthless, if not outright
harmftl, you would receive less than a twenty-dollar coupon to go back to
Sharper Image. Those are the kinds of cases that are going to get the atten-
tion of state AGs, especially when CAFA was supposed to, in some sense, re-
strict coupon settlements.
Telephone Interview with Representative from State C's AG's office (Feb. 22, 2008).
8' Brief Amicus Curiae of the Attorneys General of Alaska et al. in Opposition to
the Proposed Settlement Agreement, supra note 81, at 19.
84 See Sharper hnage, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
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jected the settlement, citing the "vigor and substance" of the AGs' par-
ticipation. 85
B. Informal Activity
Even at this early juncture, an exclusive focus on formal actions
taken by state AGs misses the potentially significant strata of informal
activity. According to Herschel Elkins, Special Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Consumer Policy, Coordination, and Development in the Cali-
fornia Attorney General's Office, most post-CAFA objections by AGs
have been handled informally: "Our [California] office has received
about 140 CAFA notices .... I have contacted defense counsel in 12-
15 proposals.... In [some], we seek clarifications or changes in the
notice or in the agreement. Counsel are quite cooperative, in large
part because they do not want formal objections by AGs." 6
This informal approach, of course, lacks the oft-touted transpar-
ency of the more formal approach. Again, in Elkins's words,
We only have materials and investigation supplied by the attorneys of the
parties, each anxious to finalize the settlement and to put the best light
on the settlement. At least superficially, the attorneys are learning to
present their settlements, and the settlements are being presented, in a
manner which would not draw adverse criticism. 87
85 Id. at 1328 ("What distinguishes this case ... is the singular appearance of the
Attorneys General of thirty-five states and the District of Columbia .... "). Of course, it
is possible that the court would have reached the same conclusion absent the AGs'
intervention.
86 E-mail from Herschel Elkins, Special Assistant Att'y Gen. for Consumer Policy,
Coordination, and Dev., Cal. Att'y Gen.'s Office, to author (Nov. 27, 2007) (on file
with author). It is worth noting that the quantity of informal intervention by the Cali-
fornia AG's office could be atypical in comparison with other states. This type of active
involvement, however, was echoed by another state AG representative:
Another part of CAFA [apart from formal objections] is that we get notices
and are able to get involved and improve the settlements without having to
file an objection .... The fact that state attorneys general are noticed and have
an opportunity to come into court and challenge provisions of a class action
settlement they don't like can sort of give you additional leverage.
Telephone Interview with Representative from State C's AG's office, supra note 82.
87 E-mail from Herschel Elkins to author, supra note 86. Recall that this is the con-
cern raised by a group of AGs at the outset in response to the proposed settlement no-
tification provision. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
SE7LEMEAIT NOTICE PROVISION
Notice how the informal approach may, in essence, bring AGs to
the settlement negotiation table."s  This unintended consequence of
CAFA's settlement notice provision has escaped scrutiny in the litera-
ture thus far.
IV. CAFA SETTLEMENT NOTICE PROVISION: TAKING STOCK
This brief foray into pre-CAFA and early post-CAFA AG activity
brings us to the final juncture: taking stock of the import of CAFA's
settlement notice provision. Two critical questions should be ad-
dressed. First, what change is wrought by placing this new (or, as we
have seen, enhanced as opposed to truly novel) regulatory mechanism
in the hands of AGs? Second, and much more daunting, are any such
changes in furtherance of "optimal" regulatory policy?
A. What Has Changed?
The survey of the pre-CAFA landscape suggests that the delinea-
tion of the government's ex post roles (initiating parallel litigation,
participating in private litigation, and reviewing class action settle-
ments) may be too sharp. Recall the several illustrative examples of
aggressive AG actions in the pre-CAFA period. In particular, recall
that AGs sometimes pursued their own lawsuits in the wake of voiced
objections to class action settlements. Most of the pre-CAFA examples
fit a pattern whereby the AGs objected to private settlements when
they threatened an internal investigation or ongoing lawsuits." Per-
88 As one state AG representative explained, "If we can suggest certain improve-
ments and the parties adopt them, I think that's ideal.... We try to get involved early
on and steer things in [a positive] direction." Telephone Interview with Representa-
tive from State C's AG's office, supra note 82.
This form of public participation in private litigation is reminiscent of state inter-
vention in punitive damages cases, where part of the punitive damages recovery re-
dounds to the state coffers. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Dam-
ages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 435 & n.343 (2003) (noting that staff in the Iowa Attorney
General's office files appearances to protect the state's interest in punitive damages
cases and also advises litigants in posttrial negotiations).
89 Herschel Elkins confirmed that one of the ways in which the California AG's
office learned of proposed settlements in the pre-CAFA period was by "being informed
by one of the parties when we had a pending investigation or case." E-mail from
Herschel Elkins to author, supra note 72. Other means mentioned by Elkins included
"happening to see public notices" and "being informed by media inquiry." Id. In a
telephone interview, a representative from State C's AG's office explained:
A lot of times there's a class action, we may already have our own investigation
going. Our goals in terms of how we want our investigation to finish-we have
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haps the settlement notice provision will spur more systematic AG in-
volvement at the review stage, providing AGs with access to corporate
practices and behaviors that are not yet the subject of ongoing investi-
gation or litigation. 0 We might ask, then, whether CAFA could be-
come a powerful tool in the hands of active AGs. Without necessarily
suggesting the awakening of a "sleeping giant" (whom you recall was
not altogether asleep at the get-go), increased AG activity might be
expected in the wake of two incidental effects of the new regulatory
provision: the consolidation and sharing of information and oppor-
tunities for collaboration among the state AGs. 9'
to take a look at the class action proceedings to make sure our options aren't
limited by an inappropriate resolution of the class action.... A lot of times, if
it's a big enough case that there's a CAFA class action case pending, there's
probably an investigation by one state or several states.... Part of it [is] trying
to make sure that interests of the attorneys general are recognized and that
people don't think you can settle a class action and you're somehow done, es-
pecially if the class action is inappropriate.
Telephone Interview with Representative from State C's AG's office, supra note 82.
o A representative in one state AG's office confirmed that reviewing the materials
submitted to comply with the CAFA settlement notice provision has "tipped us off" to
bad business practices, which were then investigated by the AG's office. Telephone
Interview with Representative from State A's AG's office, supra note 15. A representa-
tive from State C's office expressed similar thoughts:
[Pre-CAFA] sometimes the defense counsel would slip up and talk about the
class action. Certainly pre-CAFA we've gone into court and opposed class
action settlements and had them stopped. But it was more a matter of
chance and trying to pick up on clues and whether it was a parallel class ac-
tion.
Telephone Interview with Representative from State C's AG's office, supra note 82.
It is worth remembering, however, that CAFA settlement notices are by no means
the only-let alone the most significant-conduit of information to the AGs. AsJames
Tierney reminds us,
The truth is that AGs have always monitored class actions because disgruntled
litigants are regularly appearing at an AG's doorstep! ... All lawyers-
including plaintiff lawyers-are in touch with their AGs these days and dis-
gruntled litigants can easily attract the attention of an AG. Interest groups
also weigh in pretty regularly.
E-mail from James Tierney, Director of the State Att'y Gen. Program at Columbia Law
School and former Att'y Gen. of Me., to author (Feb. 19, 2008) (on file with author).
91 Recall that some AGs were not in favor of their enhanced regulatory role. See
supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (describing some AGs' opposition to the pro-
posed settlement notice provision). One state AG representative echoed this view on
the basis of his post-CAFA experience:
I've sat here and collected that stuff, it is not useful to get this. I still object
that we have to get this information. I think Congress was envisioning that the
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1. Information
CAFA's settlement notice provision has at least the incidental ef-
fect of providing a means for compiling a fairly comprehensive data-
base regarding class action settlements, given the directive that notice
be provided in every class action governed by CAFA.1
2
It is far more difficult to assess whether (apart from the intrinsic
value to academics, policymakers, and the like) greater access to such
information would have an effect on regulation-of either the ex ante
or ex post varieties. One recent case study of insurance regulators,
nonetheless, provides limited support for the proposition that such
information could make a difference. It turns out that intervention by
insurance regulators in private class action litigation is fairly infre-
quent. In a recent study by Nicholas Pace et al., regulatory agencies
played an active role in only eight percent of all attempted class ac-
tions. 93 Regulatory involvement was more likely when cases moved to
the certification stage: regulators were involved in ten percent of
cases with a motion for certification and in sixteen percent of certified
cases. This raises the question: why do we not see more regulatory in-
tervention? Pace et al. refute explanations based on lack of resources
or interest, suggesting that the explanation might have more to do
with a lack of transparency about ongoing class action litigation! 4
It may well be that regulators more generally have lacked a
method for determining the existence of class actions in which they
might wish to get involved. The AG notice provision calls class actions
to the attention of local regulators. As an information-providing
mechanism, however, its effectiveness certainly would be enhanced if
AGs would be so outraged that we would go into action on these things. Who
are we to say that this is a grossly bad settlement?
Telephone Interview with Representative from State B's AG's office, supra note 60.
92 With movement of more actions from state to federal court, CAFA itself already
tips in this direction. For instance, whereas settlements in state court rarely see the
light of day, information regarding federal class action settlements is available online
via the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. It remains to be
seen to what extent plaintiffs and public interest groups, in addition to state AGs, will
take advantage of this new database.
92 NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIvILJUSTICE, INSURANCE CLASS AC-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 99 (2007). RAND collected data from a survey of insur-
ance companies in the United States-that provided detailed information regarding
their experiences with class actions over a ten-year period. Id. at iii.
94 See id. at 99-101 ("With no centralized clearinghouse for recording the fact that
such cases have begun or for tracking their progress, regulatory administrators must
rely on other, mostly indirect avenues to bring class actions to their attention.").
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it provided for notification before certification.9q This simply suggests,
however, that the enhancement of information is an incidental (and
most likely unintended) effect of the CAFA notice provision.
2. Collaboration
A second likely incidental effect of the AG notice provision is fur-
ther collaborative efforts among the AGs. 96 There is, at present, a build-
ing movement in the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG) to address CAFA regulatory notifications in a uniform manner.
NAAG posts summaries of all class action notices on an internal website,
enabling various state AG's offices to keep abreast of recent filings and
to enable coordinated efforts where there is sufficient interest.
97
95 As one state AG representative complained: "Under CAFA, you only hear about
the case once there's a preliminary settlement. It can be sort of late in the process as
well. The case can be pretty far along." Telephone Interview with Representative from
State C's AG's office, supra note 82. Precertification notification, however, would pro-
vide little solace to those who worry about so-called "collusive" lawsuits that are filed
solely for settlement in order to preclude other suits. Cf Tobias Barrington Wolff, Fed-
eralJurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REv.
2035, 2073 (2008). Moreover, to the extent that AGs met the existing notification re-
quirement with dismay, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text, such an expan-
sion to include notice of any filed case would likely meet even greater resistance.
96 Here, too, it is important to keep in mind that myriad other forces are simulta-
neously at work and may be contributing substantially to increased coordination
among the AGs. See E-mail from James Tierney to author, supra note 90 ("Technology
and personal relations-not to mention our work here at our [State Attorney General
Program at Columbia Law School]-have made it much easier for AGs to coordinate
on everything-letters to Congress, public policy initiatives, litigation, etc.").
97 Two state AG representatives confirmed that their respective offices relied upon
those summaries to keep track of the voluminous individual filings. Telephone Inter-
view with Representative from State B's AG's office, supra note 60; Telephone Interview
with Representative from State C's AG's office, supra note 82. In this latter interview,
the representative explained:
[E]very CAFA notice that we get comes to me. I take a look at it with an at-
torney, and we distribute it to the different parts of the office based on subject
matter. If it's a consumer protection case, we send it to our economic crimes
division. If it was an overtime case, we might send it to our employment divi-
sion. We have a form where people have to say whether this is a case where it
makes sense for the attorney general to become involved in and to actively try
to improve the settlement.
Id. The representative also stated, "I think it does help in a sense that all fifty states see
the same notice." Id. Moreover, in at least a few instances, another state AG's office
had flagged a particular settlement as inadequate and suggested that other state AG's
offices review it. Telephone Interview with Representative from State B's AG's office,
supra note 60.
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The pre-CAFA landscape reminds us thatjudicial deference to the
AGs' position is by no means guaranteed. However, it seems likely
that the AG effort in Sharper Image was successful in large part because
of the concerted effort among almost all the state AGs. 9s It is also con-
ceivable that CAFA's notice requirement will encourage judges to take
these AG objections more seriously, in light of the perceived congres-
sional imprimatur on AG involvement.
Finally, given the proliferation of information and the opportuni-
ties for AG intervention-on an individual or collaborative basis-
made overt by CAFA's settlement notice provision, the "dog that
didn't bark" might lend credence to a settlement. In other words, the
absence of objection by any "appropriate State official"' 9 might be
used affirmatively in support of the proposed settlement.' 00 One fed-
eral district court has indeed embraced such a rationale. 0'
In one sense, each of these changes-though perhaps significant
for assessing the tools in the hands of AGs who might attempt greater
involvement in private litigation-is mere tinkering in the shadow of
the truly momentous question: whether CAFA leads us toward or away
from some ideal optimal regulatory policy. Included in the title of this
Article, regulatory policy is the elephant in the room. What we really
Herschel Elkins is more equivocal on this point: "Since the states have begun to
share analyses, there could be greater activity by the states, but that is far from certain."
E-mail from Herschel Elkins to author, supra note 86.
98 See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Telephone Interview with Rep-
resentative from State C's AG's office, supra note 82 ("Obviously, when you can get to-
gether a substantial number of state AGs, you have a weight that can be very persuasive
to a court.").
99 28 U.S.C. § 1715(a) (2) (Supp. V 2005).
100 Cf Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence. Collective Action Problems and
Class Action Settleinents, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 90-96 (2007) (rejecting the view that silence
of absent class members should weigh in favor of approving settlement).
101 See Browning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 04-01463, 2007 WL 4105971, at *12 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 16, 2007) ("Because numerous governmental agencies (including the FTC) were
given notice of the settlement and have not objected, this factor weighs in favor of the
settlement."). The irony here is that widespread adoption of this rationale could lead
to lesser scrutiny by courts of class action settlements, at least in the absence of an ob-
jection by a state or federal AG.
Moreover, given limitations on state AG budgets and resources, it is misguided to
assume that the AGs' silence equals assent. As one representative in a state AG's office
bluntly put it: "Every minute I spend reading these notices is taking away from busting
on some scam artist making his way through the state." Telephone Interview with Rep-
resentative from State B's AG's office, supra note 60; accord Telephone Interview with
Representative from State C's AG's office, supra note 82 ("It's a tremendous amount of
work. Just generally we probably see one hundred or so CAFA notices a year.").
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need to assess is the optimal balance of public and private enforcement
of legal standards, formulated at the state or federal level.
0 2
B. Optimal Regulatory Policy?
In order to suggest a framework for beginning to answer this key
normative question, we come full circle back to the myriad dimen-
sions of CAFA as regulatory policy and the cascading matrices set forth
in Part I.
First, as depicted in Table 1, the determination of whether to
regulate at the state (more localized) or federal (more centralized)
level features prominently in regulatory policy. The existence of in-
terstate externalities and economies of scope or scale tends to favor
regulation at the national level-in a federal forum, applying federal
law. Other factors argue in favor of regulation at a more decentral-
ized level, such as democratic accountability to regional differences in
policy preferences, the benefits of experimentation, and the compara-
tive advantage of interstate competition yielding optimal policy out-
comes. While a consensus might emerge at this abstract, theoretical
level, in practice it is difficult to avoid the fact that "[o]ne person's
healthy regional diversity is another's interstate externality."0 3
At this point, the institutional dimension of the problem is
brought into focus by Table 2. In the products liability realm, for ex-
ample, the choice between ex ante regulation and ex post liability not
only entails a federal versus state (or centralized versus local) dimen-
sion, but it also maps onto a particular institutional choice. This
choice implicates the correspondence between regulation and agen-
cies on the one hand and liability and private litigation on the other.
For this reason, a comparative institutional approach that focuses on
the relative capabilities of courts and agencies is needed.1 0 4 Given that
answers to the optimal regulation question are contingent upon ex-
102 Private enforcement of legal standards includes compensation of injured vic-
tims via private tort suits. It is worth reiterating here that tort law wears (at least) two
hats: that of compensation and that of regulation (primarily deterrence). See Sharkey,
supra note 27, at 459-71 (describing the "two faces of tort law" in the Supreme Court's
products liability jurisprudence). Here, I acknowledge that I am privileging the regu-
latory role of torts; defense of this predilection goes beyond the scope of this Article.
103 Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism The-
my, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS
166, 168 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
104 See Sharkey, supra note 27, at 502-20 (assessing the comparative institutional ad-
vantage of agencies visa vis courts in deciding whether to preempt state tort law).
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tensive findings of legislative facts, I have argued that agencies can
serve as references to courts with respect to the feasibility and desir-
ability of a uniform national regulatory policy. 10 5 The repository of
agency information-ideally reflecting a broad range of views, having
been vetted by expert and public opinion-focuses on the precise na-
ture of the agency's regulatory cost-benefit (or risk-risk) determina-
tions as well as the economic consequences of various determinations
and the effects of state regulation (including tort liability) on federal
regulatory schemes. As institutional actors, federal agencies are sus-
ceptible to attacks of unaccountability; in particular, critics charge
that states' regulatory interests will fall on deaf ears. Here, perhaps
the state AG might be seen as an effective representative of relevant
states' regulatory interests. 106
Even this perspective is too limited. For, as Table 3 is designed to
accentuate, governmental bodies (whether agencies or AGs) can regu-
late in the ex post, as well as ex ante, realm. Given the ability of pub-
lic regulators to occupy the same ex post regulatory space as private
litigants, a threshold issue is whether AGs or other public regulators
view their regulatory mandate as trying to prevent many of the same
alleged harms that drive private class action litigation. 107 If so, we
might expect at a minimum that such regulators would advise the
court of their opinion. As we saw above, the CAFA settlement notice
provision might facilitate this process, at least if there have been limi-
tations to date on regulators' ability to gain access to information
about private litigation.
As a theoretical matter, economists have posited an inverse rela-
tionship, at least on the margin, between ex ante and ex post regula-
tion. 0s It is extremely difficult to test this prediction as an empirical
105 Id. at 479.
106 Given the AGs' track record before the federal district courts (at least in the
small sample surveyed in this Article), it is worth asking whether AG participation and
input might be more effective before the relevant state or federal agency.
107 Here, again, I privilege the deterrence goal of regulation. See supra note 102. It
may well be that an AG would be motivated to intervene on alternative grounds-for
example, where the AG has no objection to the total amount the defendant is required
to pay, but nonetheless objects to the design or distribution of remedies. A common
objection heard by AGs (not to mention a driving force behind CAFA's scrutiny of cou-
pon settlements) is that lawyers' fees are too high relative to the benefit to class mem-
bers. Telephone Interview with Representative from State C's AG's office, supra note 82.
108 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 365-66 (1984); Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety
Regulation, 15 RANDJ. ECON. 271, 275-78 (1984); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating
After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REX'. 375, 387 (2007) ("The question is not whether we
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matter in the real world. Again, I allude to the insurance class action
case study. Eric Helland and Jonathan Klick have used the RAND
data provided by Pace et al. to investigate whether regulation and class
actions are substitutes on the margin.'09 They find no evidence to sup-
port the proposition that ex ante public regulation and ex post private
litigation "function as substitute[]" channels to deter harmful behav-
ior. ° To the contrary, they "uncover some evidence of a piggy-
backing effect in which either litigation follows regulatory enforce-
ment or vice versa," at least in the insurance industry."' This only cap-
tures one dimension of the regulatory policy conundrum, however.'
1 2
The larger question is how to strike the optimal balance along myriad
dimensions: between state and federal regulation, between ex ante
and ex post approaches, and between public and private regulators.
CONCLUSION
At this early juncture, it is too soon to tell whether the CAFA set-
tlement notice provision will have a significant impact on private set-
tlements of class actions, let alone any wider impact in motivating
state AGs to police certain types of misconduct more aggressively. To
the extent that the provision does have a marked effect, it will most
likely be due to the increased availability of information and to the
facilitation of coordinated efforts on behalf of groups of state AGs.
In order to assess the overall effect, it is necessary to delve beneath
abandon our ex post legal system, but whether we would tolerate the push for ex ante
regulation that would likely be its substitute.").
109 Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Tradeoffs Between Regulation and Litiga-
tion: Evidence from Insurance Class Actions, 1 J. TORT L., Oct. 2007, at 5, http://
www.bepress.com/jtl/voll/iss3/art2.
110 Id. at 9.
Ill Id. Helland and Klick were unable to determine whether private litigation fol-
lows public or vice versa. At least one AG representative, however, posits that the pig-
gybacking is unidirectional, with private litigation feeding off of public investigation
and prosecution. E-mail from Hershel Elkins to author, supra note 72 ("I know of no
investigations post-CAFA which have thus far resulted from private class action settle-
ments and I doubt there will be many, if any, in the future. However, there have been
some private actions which have followed our actions.").
112 Moreover, as Howard Erichson has argued, given the symbiotic relationship be-
tween government and private proceedings, we should in fact expect a positive correla-
tion between the two. See Erichson, supra note 38, at 5-16. According to Erichson, al-
though we might expect an inverse relationship at the macro-level-for example, a
country such as the United States combines scant ex ante regulation with a strong ex post
litigation infrastructure-at the micro-level of specific instances of harmful conduct, we
should instead expect to see mutually reinforcing ex ante and ex post actions. Id.
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the layer of formal activity to probe the informal bargaining and ne-
gotiation taking place at the behest of state AGs. The time is ripe for
positing a framework within which to evaluate the effectiveness of the
notice provision.
The settlement notice provision also provides a window on an
even grander topic: CAFA as regulatory policy. As if through a re-
fracting lens, the view of CAFA is transformed by the angle from
which it is viewed. In this Article, I have proposed a series of progres-
sively unfolding dyads in order to highlight the state/federal, ex
ante/ex post, and public/private dimensions of regulatory policy im-
plicated by CAFA. My hope is that this triad of matrices proves a use-
ful framework for evaluating the design of optimal regulatory policy-
a large domain of which the CAFA settlement notice provision is but
one small part.
